The purpose of this journal is to provide useful exchange of information among Navajo teachers. The articles in this issue deal with Navajo linguistics. Kenneth Hale and Paul Platero present an analysis of the relative clause in Navajo. Part 1 analyzes relativization forms and formulates structural descriptions for relativization rules, with reference to pronominalization rules. Part 2 presents arguments supporting the view that relativization and pronominalization are different processes, and that relativization is a raising rule. Mary Helen Creamer discusses the Navajo subject-object inversion, and the rank grouping of nouns is discussed as it relates to sentence structure. The third article, by Libby Jayne Becenti and Delphine Chee, is a discussion of the articulatory characteristics that define the phonological segments of Navajo.
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FOREWORD

This journal, Diné Bizaad Nánílìííh/Navajo Language Review, is a realization of a small group of Navajo language teachers and students, known as The Navajo Linguistic Society, who decided in January, 1973, to supplement the Navajo Linguistics Newsletter with longer articles which would give more detailed accounts of the workings of Navajo. It was decided that a journal, carrying useful language-related information for the Navajo teacher, was needed. The journal will make every effort to solicit articles that have direct relevance to classroom teaching as well as first and second language acquisition and bilingual education.

The variety of alphabetic writing systems that have been designed for Navajo has created a potentially confusing situation. Without seeking to impose a judgment as to the relative merits of alternative writing systems, this journal will use a slightly modified version of the orthography recommended at the Conference on Navajo Orthography held by the Center for Applied Linguistics in 1969. The sole departure from the recommendation of that conference is the omission of the redundant bar from /tɔ/ and /tɔ/—i.e., these are here written /tɔ/ and /tɔ/. Our usage, therefore, differs only minimally from that found in Young and Morgan's classic The Navaho Language.

This journal will use the spelling Navajo rather than Navaho, following an earlier official Navajo Tribal action.

We hope for the participation of Navajo teachers and students hañ'eeego saad baa ajilíta'íííí íi doo fiyisii bik'ahodéest'íí da kwii. Jó Diné Bizaad Nánílìííh ha'nííiíí bik'ehgo saad ndañilíííh dooleéí.

Appreciation is extended to the Center for Applied Linguistics for its support in the first few issues of Diné Bizaad Nánílìííh /Navajo Language Review.

Paul R. Platero
Editor
PREFACE

The Navajo language has been the object of scientific inquiry for many years, engaging the intellectual attention of an impressive number of linguists and anthropologists. It is possibly the most amply documented of the aboriginal languages of North America, and the literature on it can boast a number of works which qualify as classics in American Indian linguistics. These include not only works of primarily theoretical import, such as the collaborative efforts of Edward Sapir and Harry Hoijer, and of Adolph Bitanny and Gladys Reichard, but also the several outstanding volumes, of both theoretical and practical import, resulting from the extraordinarily productive scholarly partnership of William Morgan and Robert Young, as well as the enormous collection of Navajo linguistics and literature set down by Fr. Berard Haile.

One can gain an appreciation of the size of the literature on the Navajo language from the recent, up-to-date, bibliography compiled by Jim Kari for the Navajo Reading Study at the University of New Mexico (Progress Report No. 22, September, 1973). However, as in any field of scholarly inquiry, so in the study of Navajo, the more one learns, the more one comes to appreciate the gaps which exist in one's knowledge. In this instance, the gaps are both theoretical and practical -- and it is not at all clear that the theoretical and the practical can be kept strictly separate. While the Navajo language presents a field of study of enormous interest to linguistic theory, particularly in view of a number of serious challenges it offers to received assumptions about language universals, there are in fact more compelling reasons why it should continue to receive scholarly attention, of even greater intensity than in the past. Many students of Navajo, an increasing number of whom speak it as their first language, are addressing themselves to a question which is central to the concerns of the Navajo educational community.
The question is this: What role should the Navajo language play in the formal education of Navajo young people? And a closely related question: What role, if any, should Navajo linguistics (i.e., the scientific study of the Navajo language) play in education? These questions cannot really be answered in the abstract. Assuming that there is general agreement that the Navajo language has an important role to play, beyond that of a vehicle of elementary instruction, the exact nature of that role will become clear in the context of the actual development and implementation of programs within a Navajo-controlled educational system. Central to this development is the creation of a corps of Navajo-speaking language scholars, with a foundation both in practice and in theory, who can devote their energies to determining the pedagogical position which the study of their language should assume in the schools. Over the past several years, Navajo educators have, with great courage and perceptiveness, squarely faced the question of the educational role of Navajo language scholarship, and an exciting community of imaginative people -- including teachers, teacher's aides, and college students -- has grown up around this concern. This development is a result, in part, of local control of certain schools and, in part, a result of organizations like the Diné Bi'ólita' Association and the Navajo Reading Study, which devote a significant proportion of their efforts to questions of language.

Recently, a number of these people who are concerned with Navajo language scholarship and pedagogy sought to create a means of keeping in touch, so to speak, by making available to one another the various ideas and materials developed during the course of practice and study. The quarterly publication, Diné Bizaad Náníł'íih /Navajo Language Review, of which this is the first issue, is one of the means by which this exchange of information will be accomplished. Its purpose is to make available, at relatively modest cost, a wide range of materials dealing with the Navajo language. The articles appearing in the quarterly will not be limited to a single area of Navajo
language scholarship; rather, they will seek to represent all aspects of current work on Navajo, including theoretical studies of Navajo grammar and lexicon, as well as studies of more immediate applicability in language-related educational programs. Nor will the articles be limited to "finished products" of research or pedagogical trial. In fact, an important function of the quarterly will be to initiate dialogue among people concerned in one way or another with the Navajo language. Thus, articles which represent initial suggestions of fruitful lines of research and articles which present initial ideas for the productive use of Navajo-language materials in education will have as important a role to play as will articles which purport to present fully elaborated conclusions. Indeed, at this stage of our scientific understanding of Navajo grammar, for example, few articles could hope to give firm conclusions. Much the same is true in other areas of Navajo language scholarship.

The items which appear in this initial issue of the Review are reasonably representative of one of the areas to be dealt with -- namely, Navajo linguistics. We hope, however, that this selection will not leave the reader with the impression that the quarterly will be devoted exclusively to topics traditionally subsumed under the rubric of "linguistics". Navajo language scholarship is much broader than this, embracing as it does a virtual encyclopedia of cultural, philosophical, and poetical knowledge expressed in the Navajo language. It happens, nevertheless, that topics in the area of Navajo linguistics are receiving a great deal of attention currently, particularly in view of the necessity to define the role of such topics in education. It is inevitable, therefore, that linguistic articles will appear with considerable frequency in the quarterly.

The article by Paul Platero and myself, "Aspects of Navajo Anaphora", represents an initial attempt to develop a theory of the Navajo relative clause along lines somewhat different from
the theory suggested in Paul Platero's *A Study of the Navajo Relative Clause* (M.I.T. master's thesis, 1973). It is a theoretical article, but the details of the new analysis are not fully worked out. We merely present evidence in support of what might be called the "raising hypothesis" for the derivation of relative clauses, as opposed to the earlier "deletion hypothesis". We hope that the paper will be read with a severely critical eye, both in regard to the Navajo data we use and in regard to the analysis we propose to account for those data; only through a critical approach will an adequate account of the Navajo relative clause eventually emerge. The importance of the Navajo relative clause is considerable -- it offers perhaps the best example of the structural differences between Navajo and English. A full understanding of it could form the basis of an interesting unit of study for Navajo-speaking students. Even at this stage of investigation, the properties of the Navajo relative clause could form the basis of an exciting exchange of ideas among students of Navajo grammar.

The subject of Mary Helen Creamer's article, "Ranking in Navajo Nouns", is remarkably well suited to the purpose of eliciting dialogue among Navajo-speaking language scholars. It has been assumed for some time that there exists in Navajo a rule of "subject-object inversion" which effects an interchange of subject and object noun phrases. Specifically, the rule converts sentences of the form SUBJECT OBJECT yi-VERB into sentences of the form OBJECT SUBJECT bi-VERB; for example, it converts the sentence /'I'Il' dzaanééz yiztal/ into the sentence /'zaanééz Il' biztal/. The syntactic effect of this rule is, therefore, similar to that of the "passive rule" in English, which, for example, converts the active sentence The horse kicked the mule into the corresponding passive sentence The mule was kicked by the horse. But in Navajo, as contrasted with English, the application of the rule is governed by a hierarchy of nominal concepts -- with human nouns ranking highest and inanimate or abstract nouns ranking lowest. The rule applies
freely when the subject and object are equal in rank; but in cases of inequality, the rule applies or does not apply in such a way as to ensure that the higher-ranking noun appears in "topic" (i.e., initial) position. Creamer's paper presents the details of this nominal hierarchy for her own Navajo usage. Not only does this paper provide the material for an exciting discussion among Navajo speakers, it also provides the material for a unit of Navajo language study in the classroom. One of the goals in any scientific study is the discovery of generalizations which are to be found in the data which form the subject matter of the particular science. Linguistic intuitions are the data of the science of linguistics and can, therefore, constitute an important vehicle for teaching the methods of scientific inquiry. In fact, this is one of the most important roles which the study of Navajo grammar can play in education. The topic of this paper lends itself naturally to this purpose by providing students with an opportunity to make a detailed linguistic observation and to state a general rule on the basis of data to which they have immediate access as speakers of Navajo. This can be done quite simply by presenting Navajo-speaking students with the sentences, both grammatical and ungrammatical, which appear in Creamer's paper and setting them the problem of discovering and articulating the principle involved in the application or non-application of subject-object inversion. It is hoped that this article will not only stimulate discussion but also elicit other articles of a similar nature which can serve as a basis for engaging students in the discovery and formulation of linguistic generalizations.

Perhaps the most important development in Navajo linguistics is the increasing use of Navajo itself in the writing of technical and semi-technical material. This is in complete harmony with the Navajo conception of bilingual education, according to which Navajo is viewed as an essential instrument of intellectual growth and expression. The article, Diné Bizaaad Dadiits'a'áfí Naaskáá' (A Study of Navajo Sounds), by Libby Jayne Becenti and Delphine Chee, being written in Navajo,
represents what is hoped will be a frequent feature in this quarterly. It is a discussion of the articulatory characteristics which define the phonological segments of Navajo. Its importance lies not only in the phonological detail which it describes but also in the example it sets for the development of a technical linguistic terminology in Navajo. Navajo words, particularly verb-words and nominals derived from them, are typically polysyllabic, being constructed of individual morphemes which contribute to the meaning of the whole. This enables the language to coin an indefinite number of technical terms. The most obvious methods of coinage -- reduced relative clauses -- yield words which are often too long to serve in an efficient technical terminology. However, the language also makes use of the method of compounding, as exemplified in such terms as /tsëṣq/ (literally stone-star) for "glass, mica", and /lázish/ (literally hand-pouch) for "glove", yielding manageable words of at most two syllables. This article demonstrates the productivity of compounding in the creation of a technical vocabulary by presenting and defining a readily understandable and virtually complete articulatory nomenclature for Navajo.

The principles embodied in this nomenclature extend readily to all areas of linguistics and, more generally, to all areas of modern science. It seems especially appropriate that this article should appear in the first issue of Diné Bizaad Nánil'íih, since an important function of the quarterly could be the suggestion, by Navajo-speaking scholars in various fields of endeavor, of technical terminologies for all areas dealt with in modern education. There are a number of ways in which the Becenti-Chee article can be put to immediate use in the classroom. Besides its obvious relevance in teaching aspects of phoentics, it can also serve as a model for the use of compounding in the creation of a technical vocabulary -- Navajo-speaking students can themselves be involved in the creation of technical terms. The article could be organized into a unit of study by introducing one or two readily understandable phonological features -- e.g., the bilabial and apico-alveolar posi-
tions of articulation -- together with the terms which have been suggested to designate them. When additional articulatory features are explained, the students could be encouraged to invent names for them. In this way, the school as a whole could participate in the process of vocabulary development, thereby virtually guaranteeing the acceptance and efficiency of new technical terms.

In conclusion I wish to express my admiration for the Navajo educators and scholars who have worked with great vision toward the goal of ensuring that the enormous intellectual wealth of the Navajo people assume its deserved place in Navajo education. It is largely due to their efforts that the opportunity exists for an increasing number of Navajo-speakers to become involved in the study of their language. The benefits of this circumstance are extremely far-reaching, not only to the Navajo community itself, but to the country as a whole.

Ken Hale
M.I.T.
ASPECTS OF NAVAJO ANAPHORA: RELATIVIZATION AND PRONOMINALIZATION

KENNETH HALE AND PAUL R. PLATERO

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In Navajo, relative clauses appear in two forms. One of these is common in verb-final languages the world over—namely, the type in which the head noun phrase follows the relative clause and in which the relativized noun phrase (i.e., the shared noun phrase in the subordinate clause) is apparently simply deleted. Consider, for example, the sentence (1):

(1) Tl'édáá' yááti'-éé hastiin ázhosh.
    (last:night speak-REL man sleep)
    'The man who spoke last night is sleeping.'

In his study of the Navajo relative clause, Platero (1973) proposed that sentences like (1) are derived from underlying structures of the form represented by (2) below:

(2)

```
S
  NP
    V
      REL
        NP
          S
            ADV
              NP
                V
                  S
                    NP
                      S
                        NP
                          V
                            S
                              NP
                                V
                                  S
                                    NP
                                      V
                                        S
                                          NP
                                            V
                                              S
                                                NP
                                                  V
                                                    S
                                                      NP
                                                        V
                                                          S
                                                            NP
                                                              V
                                                                S
                                                                  NP
                                                                    V
                                                                      S
                                                                        NP

by deletion of a noun phrase in the subordinate, or relative, clause under identity with the head noun phrase. This deletion,

This work was supported in part by grant #5 T01 HD-00111 of the NIH. This paper is a slightly expanded version of the one read at the XII Conference on American Indian Languages, held in conjunction with the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association in New Orleans in 1973.
he proposed, is accomplished by means of a rule of roughly the form given in (3) below:

\[
(3) \quad X[NP[S Y NP Z]_S NP]_NP W
\]

\[
1 \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 5 \quad 6 \Rightarrow
\]

Condition: \(3 = 5\)

He justified the variables in this rule by demonstrating, in more complex sentences, that there is no principled upper limit to the distance which can separate terms 3 and 5 in the structural description of this rule.

However, there is another form which relative clauses can take in Navajo. In fact, this second alternative is preferred over that represented by sentence (1) -- in this alternative, there is no head noun phrase in the surface structure. The noun phrase which functions as the logical head of the relative clause is to be found in the position corresponding to its logical function in the subordinate clause rather than in the main clause. Thus, the alternative to (1) is (4):

\[
(4) \quad \text{Platero suggests that this sentence is also derived from the deep structure (2), but by deletion of the head noun phrase rather than by deletion of the lower noun phrase. This deletion is accomplished by a rule of the following form:}
\]

\[
(5) \quad X[NP[S Y NP Z]_S NP]_NP W
\]

\[
1 \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 5 \quad 6 \Rightarrow
\]

Condition: \(3 = 5\)

Note that the structural description of this rule is identical to that of (3), only the structural change is different -- rule (3) effects a backward deletion, while rule (5) effects a forward deletion. This state of affairs is reminiscent of another deletion rule in Navajo -- namely the deletion rule
which applies generally to co-referential noun phrases and whose effect is like that of pronominalization in other languages of the world—we will refer to this rule hereinafter as 'pronominalization'. Thus, for example, the sentences

(6) Hastiin ch'iniyá-(a)go deezhtlizh.
   (man went:out-COMP fell)
   'When the man went out, he tripped.'

and

(7) Ch'iniyá-(a)go hastiin deezhtlizh.
   (went:out-COMP man fell)
   'When he went out, the man tripped.'

are derived, by forward and backward deletion, respectively, from a common underlying structure of roughly the following form:

(8)

This circumstance led Platero to suggest that the same deletion principle is operative in both relativization and pronominalization; he therefore proposed that a single structural description will serve for both rules. This is enhanced by the observation that the condition on backward deletion—i.e., only possible if the deletee is in a subordinate clause—corresponds to the fact that backward deletion in relative clauses is, by definition, always into a subordinate clause. Thus, it is possible to write a single, more general, expression of the deletion operation, as in (9):
On the basis of the fact that the conditions on pronominalization appear to correspond so perfectly to the facts of relativization, Plater considered only briefly an alternative conception of Navajo relativization according to which sentences like (1) are derived by raising the lower noun phrase into head position. This alternative would convert structures of the form

\[
(10)
\]

into structures of the form

\[
(11)
\]

by means of an optional raising rule. Such a raising rule might be explicitly expressed as in (12):

\[
(12)\quad X \, [\, NP(S\, Y\, NP\, Z)\, ]_{NP} \, W \quad \Rightarrow
\]

\[
\text{1 2 3 4 5 6}
\]
Being optional, this rule would account both for sentences like (1)—in which the rule would not have applied—and for sentences like (4)—in which the rule would have applied.

However, if relativization is achieved by means of a rule like (12), then its similarity to pronominalization cannot be expressed directly in the grammar of Navajo—that is to say, it would not be possible to use rule (9) to cover both phenomena.

Chomsky (personal communication) has suggested that it would, on the other hand, be a mistake to regard the two phenomena as the same. Platero's own work is devoted to showing that relativization conforms to Ross' island constraints (Ross 1967), while pronominalization does not—i.e., in relativization there are conditions on the variable Y of (9) which do not obtain in the case of pronominalization. Moreover, if relativization is in fact by deletion, then there is another property which distinguishes it from pronominalization. In deriving a surface structure from (2), deletion must apply, while deletion in other structures, though preferred, is in fact optional. Thus sentences like (13), in which deletion has not applied are acceptable:

(13) Zééchąą'į dibé yiyiisxį biniinaa shizhé'ę
   Zééchąą'į yik adeesdįqįh.
   'Because the dog killed a sheep, my father killed the dog.'

These facts are consistent with the hypothesis that relativization and pronominalization are separate processes, and the fact about relative surface structures would follow naturally if relativization were by raising rather than by deletion.

The remainder of this paper will be devoted to further considerations which tend to support the view that relativization is different from pronominalization and, possibly, that the former should in fact be a raising rule.

One conceivable line of argument in defense of the original position—i.e., that relativization and pronominalization are the same—would take the following form: If there are
additional constraints on deletion which are identical for both relativization and pronominalization, then that would support the claim that the two phenomena are in reality the same and, therefore, to be handled by means of the same mechanism in the grammar. In this connection, consider the following fact. If backward deletion applied in the relative clause structure (14), the resulting surface structure (15) would be one whose only interpretation would be at variance with that embodied in the deep structure itself:

(14)

Thus, the surface structure is interpreted as if it had come from (16) instead of (14):

(16)

If, on the other hand, forward deletion had applied, the resulting surface structure (17) would be ambiguous (a tolerable ambiguity which is sometimes avoided by the use of the so-called 'fourth person'), but it would have at least one reading consistent with the deep structure (14):
(17) Ashkii at'éd yiyiilts'-(n)ê yidloh.
(boy girl saw-REL laugh)
(a) 'The girl that the boy saw is laughing.'
(b) 'The boy that saw the girl is laughing.'

Now suppose we attempt to account for this fact by placing a constraint on backward deletion which would prevent its applying in (14) but allow it in (16). Such a constraint might be stated as in (18):

(18) In a sentence of the form NP₁ NP₂ V, only NP₁ can be deleted.

This would ensure that the surface structure (15) could derive only from (16), not from (14).

Notice that if the embedded transitive clause in (14) undergoes passive-like subject-object inversion transformation (cf., Hale 1973), giving the intermediate structure (19):

(19) the constraint (18) will allow the initial instance of the noun phrase /at'éd/ 'girl' to delete, thereby giving sentence (20), whose interpretation is consistent with (19) (and with (14), its source):

(20) Ashkii biilts'-(n)ê at'éd yidloh.
' The girl that was seen by the boy is laughing.'

Now observe that a similar constraint must be imposed on deletion of the type referred to here as pronominalization. The constraint pertains not only to backward pronominalization, but to forward pronominalization as well. Thus, for example, in a conjoined structure like (21), only the first noun phrase in the second conjunct may delete:
Therefore, the sentence
(22) At'êèd ch'inîyà dôô ashkii yiîîiiâ̂tsâ.
(girl went:out and boy saw)
has the meaning
(23) The girl went out and saw the boy.
as is consistent with the source
(24) At'êèd ch'inîyâ dôô at'êèd ashkii yiîîiiâ̂tsâ.
(girl went:out and girl boy saw)
It cannot have the meaning
(25) The girl went out and the boy saw her.
This is predicted by the constraint (18), which guarantees
that (22) will not come from
(26) At'êèd ch'inîyà dôô ashkii at'êèd yiîîiiâ̂tsâ.
(girl went:out and boy girl saw)
If the second clause of (26) is inverted, or 'passivized',
however, deletion can apply to give
(27) At'êèd ch'inîyà dôô ashkii biîîtsâ.
'The girl went out and was seen by the boy.'
It would appear, therefore, that both pronominalization and
and relativization are subject to the constraint (18). This,
in turn, might be taken as evidence that they should be regarded
as the same thing. However, this reasoning is fallacious. In
considering a wide range of sentences in which a constraint
like (18) is operative, it becomes readily obvious that it is
not really a condition on rules but rather a condition on the
interpretation of Navajo sentences with, so to speak, missing
noun phrases which is at issue. Moreover, it is evident that
there is a general principle of interpretation for transitive
sentences in which the subject and object are third person. The principle can be expressed roughly as in (28):

\[(28) \quad (a) \text{ In sentences of the form (NP) NP yi-}V, \text{ the NP immediately preceding the verb is the logical object.} \]

\[(b) \text{ In sentences of the form (NP) NP bi-}V, \text{ the NP immediately preceding the verb is the logical subject.} \]

This principle exists independently of deletion and ensures the correct interpretation of such sentences as those in (29):

\[(29) \quad (a) \text{ 'The horse kicked the mule.'} \]

\[(b) \text{ 'The mule was kicked by the horse.'} \]

This principle extends naturally to the deletion cases and ensures the correct interpretation of transitive clauses from which one or another noun phrase has been deleted. If this is, in fact, a general principle, then we cannot claim that it is a specific property of deletion rules. It is, instead, a principle which will be invoked to interpret sentences from which some noun phrase has been deleted regardless of the way in which the noun phrase was removed. It is, therefore, independent of the question as to whether relativization is by raising or deletion.

There are other cases in which a principle of interpretation interacts with the removal of a noun phrase. Consider, for example, the following underlying structure, which would exist under the deletion hypothesis for relativization:
If forward deletion applies to this structure, it will delete the head noun phrase /bílh/ 'deer', thereby deriving sentence (31):

(31) Hastiin bílh biz'ád'eqq-q neís'ah.
    (man deer I:shot-REL | deer butchered)
    'The man butchered the deer I shot.'

whose interpretation is in accordance with the underlying structure. However, if backward deletion had applied, the derived string would be (32):

(32) Hastiin biz'ád'eqq-q bílh neís'ah.
    (man I:shot-REL | deer butchered)

The only interpretation which this string can receive is

(33) The man I shot butchered the deer.

This is clearly at variance with the meaning embodied in the underlying structure (30). Instead, the appropriate underlying structure for (32) would, under the deletion hypothesis, be (34):

(34)

In other words, in the string (32), the noun phrase /hastiin/ 'man' is taken to be the object of the verb /biz'ád'eqq/ 'I
shot him/it' as well as the subject of the higher verb /héis'ah/ 'he butchered it'. Now, there is, under the deletion hypothesis, no principled reason why one cannot apply backward deletion in substructures like (35):

(35) 

for that is precisely what happens in the derivation of (36):

(36) Biz'adéldqoqh-éé b'iíh nísézh'ah.  
(I:shot-REL deer I:butchered)  
'I butchered the deer I shot.'

Why, then, is backward deletion inappropriate in the case of structures like (30)? One might attempt to impose some such constraint as (37) on deletion:

(37) In sequences of the form

\[ X \text{ NP}_1 [\text{SNP}_2 Y]_S Z \]

\text{NP}_2 may not be deleted.

This would prevent backward deletion in (30), while allowing it in the case of structures like that which underlies (36). However, if this is indeed a constraint on the deletion rule, then it must be prevented from applying in the case of the forward pronominalization involved in sentence (38):

(38) Ashkii tl'iish bishxash-éé yil adeesdqoh.  
(boy snake bit-REL shot)  
'The boy shot the snake he was bitten by.'

This sentence comes from the underlying structure (39):
Clearly, (38) is derived from (39) in part by allowing the first instance of the noun phrase /ashkii/ 'boy' to delete the second—but this latter is precisely the noun phrase which could not be deleted according to the constraint (37). Constraint (37) must, then, have a condition on it to the effect that NP₁ and NP₂ may not be coreferential—that is to say, if NP₁ triggers the deletion of NP₂, then the deletion is allowed.

And there is some question as to whether constraint (37) ever works in the case of forward pronominalization. Consider, for example, structure (40) below:

For some speakers, the string resulting by forward deletion—i.e., (41) below—allows an interpretation in accordance with the underlying structure, while for other speakers it does not.

That is to say, for some speakers, (41) can mean

(42) When the girl yelled out, the boy kicked the dog that bit her.
In fact, for these speakers, (42) is the preferred interpretation because it corresponds to the most likely juxtaposition of events. But for other speakers, the only interpretation is

(43) When the girl yelled out, the boy kicked the dog that bit him.

For these latter speakers, a constraint like the amended version of (37) could be invoked to account for their interpretations of sentences.

It should be clear, however, that imposing a constraint on the deletion rule itself will not be a simple or straightforward matter. Not is it at all obvious that a unified constraint could be formulated to apply both to relativization and to pronominalization. Moreover, the attempt to account for the behavior of sentences like (32) by constraining the rules which derive surface structures from their underlying sources obscures the true nature of the problem. The point is this: when backward deletion applied in the underlying structure (30), it yielded a string of noun phrases and verbs so strongly open to a particular interpretation as to obliterate the one embodied in the structure itself. Specifically, in this instance, the tendency to associate the noun phrase /hastiin/ 'man' with the verb /bi'adéldqgh/ 'I shot him'--i.e., the tendency to interpret the two words as clausemates in defiance of the underlying structure--is so strong that it precludes any other interpretation. The problem, therefore, resides in the surface structure, not in the transformational rules. Evidently, in addition to interpretive principles of the type represented by (28), there are also interpretive strategies for parsing the surface representations of complex sentences. The facts surrounding sentence (32), and the class of complex structures which it represents, suggest that an elementary parsing principle like (44) is employed, with varying degrees of strictness, by speakers of Navajo:

(44) In a string $\Sigma$ of the form (NP) NP V, the subsequence (NP) NP is a clausemate with V if the string $\Sigma$ exists as a well-formed simple sentence of Navajo.
If this principle were applied to (32), it would allow only the interpretation (33), since the NP V string

(45) Hastiin bii'adéédoqii.

(man I:shot)

'I shot the man.'

exists as a well-formed simple sentence of Navajo. Similarly, the sentence

(46) Ashkii kééchąą'į bishxash-ęę ąį' yizlohi.

(boy dog bit-REL horse roped)

allows only interpretations according to which the noun phrases /ashkii/ 'boy' and /kééchąą'į/ 'dog' are clause mates with the verb /bishxash/ 'he was bitten by it', since the sentence (47) is a well-formed simple sentence of Navajo:

(47) Ashkii kééchąą'į bishxash.

'The boy was bitten by the dog.'

In other words, sentence (46) allows an interpretation corresponding to the underlying structure (48):

(48)

\[
S \rightarrow NP \rightarrow V \\
NP \rightarrow REL \\
\text{ashkii kééchąą'į bishxash-ęę ashkii ąį' yizlohi}
\]

'The boy that was bitten by the dog roped the horse.'

It does not allow an interpretation corresponding to the underlying structure (49):

(49)

\[
S \rightarrow NP \rightarrow V \\
NP \rightarrow REL \\
\text{ashkii ąį' kééchąą'į bishxash-ęę ńį' yizlohi}
\]

'The boy roped the horse that was bitten by the dog.'
It should be born in mind, however, that the parsing principle formulated as (44) is not absolute—it can be relaxed by some speakers, provided the context is sufficiently strong to bring out a competing interpretation of a structurally ambiguous string (as is the case in sentence (41)).

We have seen in the foregoing that there are circumstances under which the deletion of a noun phrase creates a surface structure which is capable only of interpretations which are in direct conflict with the meaning embodied in the deep structure. We have intimated also that any attempt to account for this fact by placing constraints on deletion rules merely dodges, and in fact obfuscates, the true nature of the problem, which has to do with the interpretation of surface structures, not with the application of the productive rules of the grammar. It is appropriate at this point to suggest an explicit conception of the functioning of rules and interpretive principles within the description of Navajo. Suppose we make the assumptions in (50):

(50)  (i) The syntactic rules of Navajo—specifically those which by one means or another effect the removal of a noun phrase constituent from a particular position in underlying structure—apply without constraint.

(ii) There exists certain principles of semantic interpretation—like (28) and (44)—which apply at the surface structure level of syntactic representation to interpret grammatical relations.

(iii) A syntactic derivation is identified as ill-formed if the surface structure interpretation principles assign it a semantic reading which is at variance with the meaning assigned by the deep structure.

If this is the correct solution to the particular problems of Navajo grammar discussed here, then it is clear that the data examined in this connection can in no way be used to support the view that relativization and pronominalization constitute a unified process. This follows, since the principles of surface interpretation—whose existence can hardly be denied, irrespective of the particular grammatical theory adopted—do
not care how a particular surface string is derived. That is
to say, their application is totally independent of whether a
particular syntactic position is vacated by means of a deletion
rule or by means of a movement rule. We are free, therefore,
to reconsider the possibility that relativization in Navajo
involves a raising rule like (12). However, aside from Chomsky's
observations mentioned earlier, our evidence for a raising rule
has only been negative. That is, we do not have any convincing
evidence against the raising hypothesis. We would like, at this
point, to consider some positive evidence in its favor.

In an important paper on Navajo syntax, Kaufman (1973) de-
scribes an unbounded rightward movement rule whose structural
description is, in its essential details, identical to (12)
This is the rule which is involved in deriving such sentences
as (51):

(51) Shizhé'é chidi niinib44z-i-ji'-de' hoozt11z.
    (my:father car drove:upto-COMP-upto-from rain)
    'Rain is progressing from the point which my
father drove the car up to.'

What is relevant in this sentence is the position, in surface
structure, of the spatial enclitic /-ji'/' up to a point'.
Notice that it appears as a suffix to the verb of the embedded
clause--i.e., it is suffixed to the verb /niinib44z/ 'he drove
it to a terminal point'. However, that enclitic normally
appears on complements of such terminative verb forms, and
verbal complements normally precede the verbs which govern
them--as in (52) below:

(52) Shizhé'é chidi aa-ji' niinib44z.
    (my:father car there-upto drove)
    'My father drove the car up to that point.'

This fact, together with the surface fact of sentence (51),
suggests strongly that there exists a rule which moves an
enclitic complement out of an embedded clause, to the right,
attaching it to a complementizer /-i-/ appearing at the end of
the embedded clause. If this is correct, then the underlying structure of sentence (51) is something like (53):

(53)

\[
\text{shizh616 \ chidi -j1\ niinizb44z-i- d61\ hootlliz}
\]

(In which EP stands for 'enclitic phrase' and E stands for 'enclitic'). The raising rule removes the enclitic /-j1/ from its normal position within the embedded clause and places it after the complementizer which follows that clause, thereby giving the derived structure (54):

(54)

\[
\text{shizh616 \ chidi niinizb44z-i- j1\-d61\ hootlliz}
\]

The raising operation, so to speak, lifts the enclitic out of the embedded clause and into the main clause. It is clear that the enclitic 'up to a point' is selected by the embedded verb, not by the main verb -- the latter selects its own enclitic /d61/ 'from'. Notice that the final positioning of the formerly embedded enclitic is essentially the same as that of the head of a relative clause --namely, in the position immediately following the embedding.

We have here what seems to be incontestable evidence for a movement rule whose effect is basically that of the raising rule (12) proposed for relativization. It is not inconceivable that enclitic raising is, in fact, to be identified as a special case of relativization. If this is so, then relativization must itself be a raising rule.

There is one possible argument against this suggestion, but
further study will, we believe, prove the objection to be invalid. Kaufman assumed that enclitic raising is an obligatory rule. On the other hand, if relativization is accomplished by raising, then it must be optional in order to account for sentences like (1) -- with raising. If, however, enclitic raising were also optional, then this disparity would vanish. In this connection, consider sentence (55), which is synonymous with (51):

(55) Shizhè'ë chidi niini2b44z-ð1' hoo2tïïïi.

Notice that the enclitic /-jï'/ is entirely absent from the surface string here. We would like to suggest that this version is derived from precisely the same source as (51) by simply taking the option of not applying the raising rule -- this is, at least, a natural way to account for the synonymy. We must, of course, also suggest that the enclitic deletes from the embedded clause -- but this seems a reasonable move, since otherwise the enclitic would be left dangling, unattached to any phonologically constituted constituent in that clause.

If enclitic raising and relativization are both optional, then their properties are virtually identical; and there is little reason not to regard them as being the same process. But there are details inhering in sentence (55) which suggest an even stronger argument in favor of the raising hypothesis for relativization. Observe that sentence (55) not only lacks an appearance of the enclitic /-jï'/, it also lacks a complementizer on the verb of the embedded clause. This suggests that the element which we have referred to as the complementizer (COMP) in fact emanates from the embedded clause and is, itself, positioned in surface structure through the agency of the raising rule. This would require us to amend our conception of the deep structure (53) and to regard the element /-ï-/) as a constituent of the embedded enclitic phrase (EP) -- as in (56):

(56)
when raising applies, it is the entire EP which raises. If raising does not apply, then the EP simply deletes. It is possible that the element /-i-/ is a determiner or a pronoun of some kind -- perhaps it is to be identified with the phonologically identical element /-i/ appearing in the pronominal forms /shị/ 'I', /bị/ 'he, she, it', /nihị/ 'we, you nonsingular', and [hó] (< /hwị/) 'one' (and whose failure to appear in /ni/ 'you singular' is a separate problem). If it is in fact a pronoun, then its disappearance from (55) is simply a special case of a rule needed elsewhere in Navajo to delete independent pronouns.

Now observe that in relative clauses involving full noun phrases, a complementizer -- heretofore referred to as the 'relativizer' (REL, /-yëg/ or /-ígii/, depending on tense) -- appears on the embedded clause whether or not the noun phrase itself is in the raised position. We would like to suggest that this is in fact a determiner emanating from the embedded noun phrase and that there are two versions of raising -- one in which only the determiner raises and another in which both the noun phrase and the determiner raise. The former version, we propose, is blocked in the case of enclitic raising -- since the enclitic is a suffix to the embedded determiner, the determiner cannot raise alone, unaccompanied by the enclitic; therefore, in the case of enclitic phrases, the only raising allowed is that in which both elements are moved.

If the complementizers, or relativizers, /-yëg/ and /-ígii/, which appear in noun phrase relative clauses are in fact determiners, then it should be possible for them to appear on simple noun phrases, and in simple sentences. The fact that this is indeed the case enhances our argument. Consider the following sentences:

(57) (i) ḳǐfh'-gë dilwo'.
       'The aforementioned horse is fast.'

(ii) ḳǐfh'-ígii dilwo'.
       'The (one which is a) horse is fast.'
Although there remain a number of details which must be worked out -- in particular, the exact formulation of the raising rule; the question as to whether it is a copying rule or not, and the like -- we feel that enough evidence is in for us to conclude that the struggle between the two competing conceptions of Navajo relativization is won decisively by the raising hypothesis.

t'dá ákódi

References


ADDENDUM

This paper was also read at the Winter Meetings of the Linguistic Society of America, in San Diego, 1973. We are grateful to Suzette Elgin for presenting the paper for us at those meetings.
RANKING IN NAVAJO NOUNS

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The topic of this paper is the Navajo rule of subject-object inversion, the syntactic effect of which is closely similar to that of the passive in English. I have reviewed my knowledge of the Navajo language as a native speaker to determine the conditions under which subject-object inversion occurs, cross-checking my findings with other native speakers. I have restricted this review to those occurrences found in sentences with transitive action verbs. That is, in Navajo, "yi-" and "bi-" verbs.

The inversion occurs between the deep structure and surface structure of these sentences. Unlike English, in which such inversions (i.e., the passive) occur under conditions having to do with the semantic content and syntactic properties of the verb, the inversion in Navajo is governed by reference to a system of classification of nouns into status groups, or ranks, within a Navajo world view. Within this system, the nature of the verb plays a secondary role.

In a Navajo world view, the various beings or objects in the world each have certain inherent qualities or characteristics. These qualities are inferred from experience in terms of what you would ordinarily expect these beings to do, or how...

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you would expect them to interact with each other. These qualities tend to lend status to some nouns and not to others. Qualities which tend to give higher status are: 1. capacity for having intent or purpose; 2. intelligence; 3. strength, vigor, aggressiveness, or special potency; 4. usefulness to man, or relatedness to man; and 5. animation, or capacity for movement. This world view is built upon common sense inferences from ordinary experience, and involves few abstractions, or abstract explanations of phenomena.

Consistent with this world view, the characteristics of each being identified by a noun in Navajo appear to be summed up in an inherent "capacity to act upon" in relation to other beings. The noun is assigned to a group of nouns which have the same degree of freedom to interact with others. Each such group is ranked above all other groups upon which its members can act freely, but which cannot freely act upon them. Each group is ranked below all other groups whose members can act freely upon it, or upon whose members it cannot freely act. Exceptions to these rankings appear to be related to the same common sense ideas of "who can be expected to be able to act upon whom".

The actual rankings which I am reporting here, however, have not been derived from this common sense rationale, but from the review of a large number of typical Navajo sentences as ordinarily framed by myself and other native speakers from our experience of customary usage. The rationale was derived by inference out of usage, rather than the other way around. I must confess that after I had repeatedly constructed and compared both preferred and non-preferred structures, I, myself, would become confused as to what was proper usage and what was not. I would then have to refer to someone else whose mind was not filled with so many other ways of saying something, and so many possible reasons for doing so.

The general rules for subject-object inversion in Navajo seems to be as follows:
The first noun phrase in the deep structure is the subject of the sentence.

The second noun phrase in the deep structure is the object of the sentence.

If there is a difference in status between the nouns related by the action of the verb, the higher status noun is the preferred surface-structure subject, or topic, regardless of the deep structure of the sentence. If the deep structure identifies the higher status noun to be the actor of the verb, the active (yi-) form is used.

Active form (yi-)

NP
NP
V

ashkii Zéécháą'í yiztał
(subject object yi-verb)
'The boy kicked the dog.'

However, if the deep structure identifies the higher status noun to be the receiver of the action of the verb, the passive (bi-) form is used.

Passive form (bi-)

1) deep structure

NP
NP
V

Zéécháą'í ashkii yishxash
(subject object yi-verb)
(dog boy bit)
'The dog bit the boy.'

11) surface structure

NP
NP
V

ashkii Zéécháą'í bishxash
(object subject bi-verb)
(object = derived subject or topic)
(boy by dog was bitten)
'The boy was bitten by the dog.'
The effect of these constraints is to ensure that the higher ranking noun phrase appears in the initial position in the sentence. Or to put it another way, in cases of unequal rank, the topic of the sentence must be the higher ranking noun phrase.

If there is no difference in status between the nouns related by the action of the verb, either noun may be chosen to be the derived, or surface subject of the sentence. The subject chosen by the speaker is the object of major interest or emphasis. If the speaker chooses the actor of the verb to be the surface subject of the sentence, the active verb form (yi-) is used. But if the speaker chooses the goal of the verb to be the surface subject of the sentence, the passive verb form (bi-) is used.

Optional forms for equal status nouns

1) Active

\[
 S \quad NP \quad NP \quad V \\
 \text{ashkii} \quad \text{at'êd} \quad \text{yinoozhêéz} \\
\text{(subject object yi-verb)}
\]

'The boy is chasing the girl.'

2) Passive

\[
 S \quad NP \quad NP \quad V \\
 \text{at'êd} \quad \text{ashkii} \quad \text{binoozhêéz} \\
\text{(object subject bi-verb)}
\]

'The girl is being chased by the boy.'

The semantic effect of subject-object inversion in this case appears to be quite similar to that of the passive in English.

With few exceptions, the status of nouns may be found by classifying them according to the following groupings, listed in rank order from highest to lowest. Nouns within each of the groupings are treated as of equal status in subject-object inversion constructions, and those in each group are treated as of higher status than those of all groups listed below it, and lower status than those of all groups listed above it.
Rank or status groupings

Group 1. Nouns denoting persons. All human beings are treated, for the purposes of subject-object inversion, as of equal status, regardless of whether grouped, or individual, or of ethnic, sex, rank, or age differences. Two exceptions to the top-ranking status of this category are noted: first, lightning when used with a verb denoting its characteristically potent striking force is treated as of equal status with persons; second, newborn infants are of lower status than other humans. When interacting with the larger animals they are treated as of equal status with those animals. This remains true, however, only as long as the infant retains the helplessness characteristic of the newborn. As soon as he becomes capable of intent and movement, he is treated as fully human. Examples follow:

Diné ashkii yiztaž.
Ashkii diné biztaž.
Ashkii diné yiztaž.
Diné ashkii biztaž.

'\textit{The man kicked the boy.}'
'\textit{The boy was kicked by the man.}'
'\textit{The boy kicked the man.}'
'\textit{The man was kicked by the boy.}'

Ashkii at'éeéké yinoozhééž.
At'éeéké ashkii binoozhééž.

'\textit{The boy is chasing the girls.}'
'\textit{The girls are being chased by the boy.}'

Ashkii at'éeéké binoozhééž.

'\textit{The girls are chasing the boy.}'

Naat'áanii doonáldzídí bilágáana yíyiisxí.

'\textit{The fearless leader killed the white man.}'
'\textit{The white man was killed by the fearless leader.}'
'\textit{The white man killed the fearless leader.}'
'\textit{The fearless leader was killed by the white man.}'

'Ii'ni' diné yiž zée' díížch'il.

'\textit{Lightning struck the man.}'
'\textit{The man was struck by lightning.}'

Diné iì'i'ni' biž zée' díížch'il.
However, in the following cases, one structure (indicated *) is not preferred, because of the lower status of the infant.

*Awéé'chi'í diné yiztáz.  The baby kicked the man.
Diné awéé'chi'í biztáz.  The man was kicked by the baby.

Diné awéé'chi'í yiyisxį'.  The man killed the baby.
*Awéé'chi'í diné biisxį'.  The baby was killed by the man.

And in the following cases, involving animals of lower status than man, because of the lower status of the infant human either structure is acceptable.

Chįįh yee'idilohiı
awéé'chi'í yishjizh.  The elephant crushed the baby.
Awéé'chi'í chįįh
yee'idilohiı bishjizh.  The baby was crushed by the elephant.

Group 2. Nouns denoting the larger animals and medium sized animals of special intelligence or relationship to man (such as the dog) and predators. This category includes the horse, donkey, mule, bull, cow, elephant, lion, bear, wolf, and wildcat. These are considered equals, not just because of size, but because of inherent capacity to act independently toward each other. For example:

Dóola shash yizgoh.  The bull gored the bear.
Shash dóola bizgoh.  The bear was gored by the bull.

Zéchąą'į dzaanéez yishxash.  The dog bit the mule.
Dzaanéez Zéchąą'į bishxash.  The mule was bitten by the dog.

However, in the following cases, one structure is not preferred because it violates the principle of ranking, whereby humans are higher than animals.

*Dóola diné yizgoh.  The bull gored the man.
Diné dóola bizgoh.  The man was gored by the bull.
And, in the following cases, involving interaction with nouns in lower groupings, one structure is not preferred.

Shash dibé yiylisxį'. 'The bear killed the sheep.'
*Dibe shash biisxį'. 'The sheep was killed by the bear.'
*Dibe awéé'chi'į yiztaž. 'The sheep kicked the baby.'
Awéé'chi'į dibé biztaž. 'The baby was kicked by the sheep.'

Group 3. Nouns denoting the medium sized animals. This category includes sheep and goats, turkeys, eagles, hawks, cats, chickens, deer, antelope, foxes, and coyotes. The following are acceptable:

Mósí tazhii yinoožchéę́. 'The cat is chasing the turkey.'
Tazhii mósí binoožchéę́. 'The turkey is being chased by the cat.'

But in the following case, involving interaction with a lower grouping, one structure is not preferred.

Mósí na'azísí yinoožchéę́. 'The cat is chasing the gopher.'
*Na'azísí mósí binoožchéę́. 'The gopher is being chased by the cat.'

Group 4. Nouns denoting the small animals, including the squirrel, gopher, chipmunk, mice, rabbits, songbirds, snakes, frogs, toads, and turtles. In the following, inversion is acceptable:

Tlí'ish áníngii na'asts'qqsi yiyliisxį'. 'The rattlesnake killed the mouse.'
Na'asts'qqsi tlí'ish áníngii biisxį'. 'The mouse was killed by the rattlesnake.'

But in the following case, involving interaction with a lower grouping, one structure is not preferred.
Tsís'ná na'asts'qősí yishish. 'The bee stung the mouse.'
Na'asts'qősí tsís'ná bishish. 'The mouse was stung by the bee.'

Group 5. Nouns denoting the insects, spiders, worms, centipedes, and scorpions. The following are both acceptable forms:

Tsís'ná na'ashjé'ii yishish. 'The bee stung the spider.'
Na'ashjé'ii tsís'ná bishish. 'The spider was stung by the bee.'

But in the following case, involving interaction with a lower grouping, one structure is not preferred.

*Tó wóláchíí' yiýiisxį. 'The flood killed the ant.'
Wóláchíí' tó biisxį. 'The ant was killed by the flood.'

Group 6. Nouns denoting natural forces such as windstorms, flood, sunshine (heat), and forest or range fire. In the following case, involving interaction with a lower grouping, one structure is not preferred.

Tó dá'deestl'in yinahjį' ninígo'. 'The flood came to rest against the dam.'
*Dá'deestl'in tó binahjį' ninígo'. 'The dam stopped up the flood (lit.: The dam had the flood come and lean on it.)'

Group 7. Nouns denoting plants and inanimate objects. A special rule governs the interactions of the nouns within this classification when verbs with yi- and bi- forms are used. In each case, the semantic content of the verb implies movement on the part of one of the nouns in the sentence, and this noun then takes higher status than the more stationary object. In the following cases the noun denoting the entity which moves has higher status. Thus one structure is preferred over the other.

Tsé t'il'ís yik'i ch'ínimááž. 'The rock rolled upon the tree.'
And in the following case, involving interaction with the lowest grouping, one structure is preferred.

*Šq t'ís yiyísxį.  'Old age killed the tree.'
T'ís šq biisxį.  'The tree died of old age.'

Group 8. Nouns denoting abstractions such as old age, hunger, disease (or its symptoms), "germs", emotions, or other things of which no action is seen other than effects. You may find it of some comfort to know that in Navajo old age cannot kill you. You may only die of it.

Each of the examples cited relates nouns which are either in the same grouping, or in the next grouping above or below. The pattern of relationship between nouns in groupings more widely separated in classification is consistent with the the examples shown. That is, group 1 nouns are of higher status than all other groups, and group 2 nouns of higher status than all other groups except group 1 and so on. There is one exception to this rule. Group 7 nouns, and some group 2 and 3 nouns are occasionally "personified" in legendary writing or story telling. In this case the personified noun is treated as of equal status with whatever category of nouns it is interacting with in the sentence. That is to say, either yi- or bi-form verbs may be used. And either noun may be the subject or topic, at the story teller's option.
Notes

1. This paper was read at the Xth Conference on American Indian languages held in conjunction with the Annual Meetings of the American Anthropology Association, 1971, New York.

2. This rule has also been discussed in Kenneth Hale "A Note on Subject-object Inversion in Navajo" in Kachru, Braj B., et al. eds. Issues in Linguistics: Papers in Honor of Henry and Renée Kahane, University of Illinois Press.
LIBBY JAYNE BECENTI AND DELPHINE CHEE
LUKACHUKAI SCHOOL

I. Äżtsé ha'oodzi'ígií. Dif naaltsoos ályaagíí éí saad diits'a' naalkaah ha'nínígíí yaa halne'. Diné Naabeehó daniínígíí bą'ígód bá da'ólta'. Ako ázhíini nanitínígíí t'óyó nanilt'a nahalin háálá saad diits'a' baa hodooñihgóo saad bi-nahjí' doogíí t'áá nihee ádin. Éí bąq kwii bą'ígogó saad t'óó baantséhésékéjigo íilyaa.

Ayoó nanilt'a dif saad naalkaah biz haz'ánígíí; ákoníi dif naaltsoos bii' hane' ályaagíí doo hózhó yéego nanitl'agód álya. Ákót'éego ályaagíí éí biniyéii hóló. Éí éi T'áá Diné bá'ólta'í daniínígíí saad diits'a' naalkaah doo yaa da'ólta' da. Dif naaltsoos yínít'go saad áníid áńáá daalyaagíí hazhó'ó baa hane'go ážkéé' siníl.

Äżtsé baa náhódóot'įįgígíí éí yínhi t'óó ádaalne'doo áádoó ákóne'éí yínhi ádaalyaagíí hait'éego choo'ńígíí físhįį ádoolnįį.

Dif yínhi chodaaz'įįgígíí éí Massachusetts Institute of Technology ádaalyaa ñt'įį'. Ako dif Mary Helen Creamer dóó Ellavina Tsosie dóó Paul Platero dóó Kenneth Hale éí áájí yaa ndaashnishgo t'óó bits'ąąd'óó dif naaltsoos íilyaa. Ahéhee' bidii'ni éí ako.

II. Za'áán baa hane'ii. Dif éí kwe'é bilagáana vowel dëii'nígíí éí za'áán wolyéego éí dif dif'go dahshijaa'go bits'ąąd'éé' saad údiiits'a'įįgíí éí a, e, i, o.

a éí zoozii doo ažch'i' áñát'įįhgoó éí hatsóghąą'biz haz'ąągíí diits'a'go éí tsóyah wolyé, háálá hatsoo' yaa át'é nahalin biniinaa. Áádoó hatsóo' t'ąąd' át'é, áko tsót'ąą' aždó' wolyé. Dif kwe'é

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naashch'qą'igif yik'i sinil:

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e ájinígo éí zoozá qą' át'éego hatsoo'igif tsójó' tsóyah át'é. Hatsoo' náás át'éego bininnaa tsónáás wolyé.

1 dif za'dán éí tsónáás dóó tsōdah.

0 dif éí hatsoo' t'ąą' át'é dóó hódah, ako tsót'ąą' dóó tsōdah.

Za'dán hazée' góne' dadiits'a'go bik dahnahaz'ánigif éí kot'é:

III. Zatl'ah baa hane'!i. Dif consonants wolyéhígii éí saad bec dadiits'a'go éí diméjigo zatl'ah dabidii'ni. Éí hazée'déé' nízh'i háách'igii ní'tl'ahgo óolyé. Nááná Zahi át'éego baa nááháne'go éí hayi'déé' háyolígii hazée' góne' ha'át'fishi' biniízt'l'ahgo áhdíl'ni. Hazée' góne' aniízt'l'ahigii éí dif hawoo' dóó hatsoo' lá. Saad tádíiin dóó bi'aan al'qą' át'éego dadiits'a'. Kwe'é za' saad ažkéé' níi'níl t'óó binahji' ééhózin biniiyé.

chizh      hwce       bilid     shash     yízhí
dí'qó'     waa'       zhóni     tin       yaa
dízik      jí          ma'lli     tsin      zéé
nah         ko'        sis        tlah      nabégili
A. ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከላይ፣ ለልሳ ያል ከlaus,


teneligi bi' haz'anígii dayózhí.

Tsógháa' - Dii eíd ciis kiiki bii'dá4' yajfIti'. Dii dli a/k/a at'ágh legi bee yadeillti' 14. DII ala/wi'gIf 4/ hadaa' bee yati', ako dli daa'ii woly6. DII hadaa' at'ilhgo bee saad diits'a', dII (III /b/ deiln/.}

B. Saad bee diits'a'

Saad bee diits'a' ha'nínígii å1 position of articulation ólyé. Saad bee diits'a'igii dii hatsoo' uóó hazée' až'aq ándá'í'lggo bee yájížti'ígii diits'a'go, dóó hatsoo' naha'náago dóó dii hajéí yilzhóóli bii'dég' hayol bee yájížti'. Éii dii ázká anájah nahalingo akó dii mléi saadíi diits'a'. Saad bee diits'a' dii'nínígii éi díi'go až'áq át'æego bee yádeilti' lá. Dii aláqaj'ígii éi hadaa' bee yáti', akó dii daa'ii wolyé. Mléi hadaa' ažch'4' át'ílhgo bee saad diits'a', éi díi /b/ deizní. Béésh dóó bis dóó bááh jiniihgo éi díi bee bééhózin. Díi éi na'ashch'aa'ígii yaa halnae:
Daa'ii

Dii daa'ii dabidi'nî. Bee wójihigii elig hadaa' t'áá álaa
ažch'i' át'ëego bee saad ájiiž'i'íhii. Kó òëego él /b/ döó
/m/ bee ájini.

Ndânaa ñii jë' él tsólatah-wónií'ii wolyé. El dî hëtsoo'
bílatahgi hawónii'ii béédîhjëgo bee yáti'. El /d/ délñinigii
bee béehožin. Déeh, dîí, döó dëán dajózhígo bee béehožin.

Tsólatah -wónií'ii

Dii tsólatah -wónií'ii bee wójí. El dî wónií'ii wódaññé'ígii
hëtsoo' bílatahgi bidîhjëgo bee /d/, /t/, /t'/, /s/, etc.
ájini.
DADIITS'A'IGII NAASKAA'/ 43

Tsodáa' - wóníf'ii

Tsodáa' - wóníf'ii deilmínígii éi tsodáa' wóníf'ii biidi'ággo wójí. Éi dii hatsoo' biidi'ággi wóníf'ii wódahdég'ígii béédiijíjgo /j/, /ch/, /ch'/, /sh/, /zh/ ájíni.

Nánán dii akéédég'ígii éi tsógháq' - azahat'áahii wolye. Éi dii hatsoo' bigháq'ígii azahat'áahii béédiijíjgo óolyé. Éí bee dadiits'a'ígii éí /g/; gah, gish, ge', jínifigo bee bééhózin.
BEST COPY AVAILABLE

LIBBY JAYNE BECENTI AND DELPHINE CHEE

Tsógháá' - azahat'áhii deiłníígíí éí tsógháá' - azahat'áhii
Díí hatsoo' bigháágíí hazahat'áhii béédiijílgo /g/, /k/, /k'/, /x/, /h/, dóó /gh/ bee ájííí.

Díí éí ájtsé bitaa'ínnííjíigíí hoz bééhózingo éí Diné bizaad doo nanił'tagóó bee bóhojoo'ááh.

C. Biि dahnahaz'ágóo saad bee dádiits'a' bina'idikíid

A. Díí kwe' é díí'go ał'qá áł'éego saad dádiits'a'ígíí ałñáqah nídádií'níí dóó índa dádiits'a'ágoó baa hodilníih. Díí bee hadahwiis'áhíígíí ałñáqah nídas'nilgo éí díí'go dahnaazhja'go ádadoolnííž. Bee hadahwiis'áhíígíí éí /b/, /d/, /j/, /g/.

1. Ájtsé ndadoo'nííž, éí dádiits'a'ígíí bik'ehgo.
2. Kwe'é saad t'óó bee hadahwiis'áhíígíí ažkéé' ndádií'nííž.
3. Ádído kóne'é éí áltaanásdzíid dooleez.
   Dééh       gah       joož       béezh
   Bis        jish      bááh       jádí
   Gish       dóó       daah       ge'
4. K'ad éí díí saad siníígíí bee ádadohní.
   (hadaa' dóó hatsoo' ał'qá ánnát'ígíí goó bee áhá'ní).

B. Biि dahnahaz'ágóo saad bee dádiits'a'ígíí ch'ínáánát'íí.

1. Daa'ii - jö hadaa' t'áá áłáh ažch'íí áljííž'íígho saad jidíííts'íígho ólóyé díí'nííž.
2. Tsólatah - wóníí'íí - éí hatsoo' bíílátahgo hawoo' bikétsíídí béédiijílgo ólóyé.
3. Tsódáá' - wóníí'íí - Tsóddáá' - wóníí'íí jiniígho éí hatsoo' bídáá'íígh hawoo' bikétsíídí béédiijílgo ólóyé.
4. Tsógháá' - azahat'áhii - Díí éí hatsoo' bigháágíí hazahat'áhii béédiijílgo ólóyé.

Díí díí'go ájtsé ndáas'nííígíí bik'ehgo saad ła' ažkéé' ndadoo'nííž k'ad.
Ds'i, dl. bi, f. m. b. ma. mag. air.

Tsódá' - wónííf'ii

jish
chidi
ch'ah
shádí
zhah

gah
kin
hawos
hosh
agha'
D. Vol háatsxaaz


/m/ jinihgo hayolígíí díí hazéé'déé' háatsxaaz da. Díí /m/ jinihgo hayolígíí háchíshtahdeé' háyolée éí díí chisshyol wolyé. /m/ bií dannahaz'ágó saad bee dadiits'a'igfi éí dàa'íí daolyé. /n/ chisshyol at'éendi díí dàa'íí at'éeda.

/ma/ jinihgo éí háchíshtahdeé' hayol háatsxaaz zeh. Díí ma'ashch'áa' yaa halne'igíí éí chísshyol wolyé.

/b/ jinihgo éí hayolígíí díí hazéé'déé' háatsxaaz da dóó díí doo háchíshtahdeé' da, éí díí hayolígíí kót'ííngó volkaaz wolyé.
Daa'i'i-yolkax

/b/ xinihgo éí hayolígii azahat'áahii dá'á-dilxalkgo (hayolígii t'6ó bida'dilxalkgo) t'6ó riiłtli'. Zatl'ah kót'éhigii yolkax wolyé. Éi dif na'ashch'ág'ígii yaa halne'. Éi dif hayolígii t'6ó k'ékaxgo dif /b/ t'6ó daa'i'i ha'nínígii biyaagi yisdzoh. K'ad éi dif saad bee dadiits'a'ígii d6ó yol háátxaağıii azkée' ndadoo'níx.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daa'i'i</th>
<th>Tsólátah-</th>
<th>Tsódáá'-</th>
<th>Tsóghág'-</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wóníf'ii</td>
<td>wóníf'ii</td>
<td>azahat'áahii</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>j</td>
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<td>t</td>
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<td>k</td>
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<td>t'</td>
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<td></td>
<td>k'</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chifshyol</td>
<td>m</td>
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Yoldqgh d6 d yoldqgh da

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<tr>
<th>Yolkal</th>
<th>d6</th>
<th>yoldqgh da</th>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
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<td>j</td>
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<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>ch</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yolch'iz d6 /t/, /ch/, d6 /k/ bee dadiits'a'. Ef d6 hayolgiff hazoolii d6'idiikza'go 6olye. Ef /'/ bee b66h6zin a6d6'.

Yolch'iz

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<th>Yolkal</th>
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<th>yoldqgh da</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Aniid1 yol h'atsxaaz baa dah1one'ig1i e1 k'ad k66 alys' sinil. Yol h'atsxaaz t'iz dahna'haz'1nig1i za' yoltl'ah wolye. Ef d6 hayolgiff hatsoo' bik66'g66 h'atsxaazgo. /z/, /zh/, /gh/-go dadiits'a'ig1i e1 yoltl'ah daolye. Zatl'ah za' yoltl'ah daolyehig1i zo6z nahalingo dadiits'a'ig1i e1 bizhi' yolz6z. A6d6 d6d yoldz6z da. D6d yoldz6z e1 zoozli ditsxizzo diits'a'go 6olye. Dadiits'a'ig1i e1 /z/, /zh/, /gh/, e1 d6 bee b66h6zin. Doo yoldz6z da wolyehig1i e1 d6 d6 hayolgiff t'66 h'atsxaaz d6d zoozli d6d diits'a' da. /s/, /sh/, /x,h/ jiniihgo bee b66h6zin.

Yoldz6z d6 d yoldz6z da

<table>
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<th>Yoltl'ah</th>
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<th>yoldz6z da</th>
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<td>yoldz6z</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>zh</td>
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<tr>
<td>d6</td>
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<td>sh</td>
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Ako tsólátah-wónif'ii ádaat'éii éí kót'éego ažts'á'níil:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ažníiyol</th>
<th>ažts'ághjí ybol</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>dl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>t'l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t'</td>
<td>l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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Saad bee dadiits'a' d66 yol háátsxaaz:

Daa'íí Tsólátah-wónif'ii ažníf'-ažts'ághjí ybol

Tsólátah-wónif'ii azahat áahii

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yolkaž</th>
<th>Yolgqogh</th>
<th>dolgoh</th>
<th>yolch'ízh</th>
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<td>k</td>
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<td>ch'</td>
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<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>k</td>
<td>sh</td>
<td>x, h</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
E. Dadiits'a' béełożin Dadiits'a' béełożin éí features ándéélííni. Díí kwe'é éí dadiits'a' béełożiníí álkée' nináádaníí'nifíí. /+/ si'í ago éí holóno át'é, /-/ go éí ádingo. /-dáa'ii/ bikáá'go éí dáa'ii té'dágéédgo áha'ní, éí doodago éí doo dáa'ii da niígo át'é.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>/j/</th>
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<tr>
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<td>+zatl'ah</td>
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References


Platero, Paul, Ken Hale, Mary H. Creamer, and Ellavina Perkins, (1973) *Grammatical Terms in Navajo*, manuscript, MIT.

Editor's note: The illustrations used in this paper are reproductions from Hale and Honie, *An Introduction to the Sound System of Navajo*, (1972).
DINÉ BIZAAD NÁNIL'ÍI /NAVAJO LANGUAGE REVIEW

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